Israeli intelligence agents were aware of the plan to attack on October 7th a year before it occurred.
On October 8th, the day after the Hamas attack, I penned an article calling bullshit on the “intelligence failure” narrative that emerged immediately in the aftermath– how could the governing authorities and media call it confidently an “intelligence failure” mere hours after the event?– just as the same narrative emerged just following the 9/11 attacks in Manhattan and DC.
Although I always take the time to carefully weigh evidence before making any definitive statements, as responsible journalists do, I didn’t feel compelled to wait or hedge in this case because it was palpably clear from the start that the narrative was total propaganda and would subsequently be debunked in the coming days and weeks.
Despite the scarcity of evidence on October 8th, common sense contradicted the narrative of an “intelligence failure.”

Gaza is possibly one of the most extensively monitored areas in the world, with a significant amount of surveillance from above (utilizing satellite and drone technology) and intelligence gathering by Mossad agents on the ground (referred to as “human intelligence” or “humint” within the intelligence community).
· Gaza is among the most densely populated strips of land on Earth
· The Israeli government controls all of Gaza’s borders in a total siege-style blockade. Nothing goes in or out without the state’s blessing
· The October 8 operation involved tens of thousands of operatives and a bevy of equipment that would be virutally impossible to move into and arund Gaza without detection
Hamas evidently received assistance in terms of funding and resources from abroad, and these resources would not have been able to enter the strip without being noticed.
· Months, if not years of planning went into the operation, including erecting a mock Israeli town inside of Gaza to use for practice. Israeli intelligence literally watched these training sessions from outposts on the border.
Hamas received support from Iran and had a strong motive to launch its attack at that specific time. This was because Israel was close to reaching agreements with Sunni Muslim countries to normalize relations. These agreements would have posed a risk to Iranian interests, and Israel was well aware of this.

Netanyahu’s government was struggling to maintain its grip on power, facing unprecedented protests and criticism. With the prime minister himself facing the possibility of imprisonment on corruption charges, it seemed that the only way for him and his allies to stay in office and avoid legal consequences was to create a distraction, such as a dramatic and prolonged military conflict. This would allow them to maintain their grip on power and avoid accountability, even if it meant disregarding valuable intelligence.
… And this is by no means an exhaustive list of the reasons that point to the impossibility of Israeli intelligence ignorance of the impending attack and the incentives that all parties involved had to let October 7 play out the way it did.
The Egyptian intelligence agency, which has limited authority in the Gaza Strip, had prior knowledge of the attack and alerted their Israeli counterparts. However, the warning was disregarded.
We have received additional confirmation.
Via The New York Times:
“Israeli officials obtained Hamas’s battle plan for the Oct. 7 terroist attack more than a year before it happened, documents, emails and interviews show. But Israeli military and intelligence officials dismissed the plan as aspirational, considering it too difficult for Hamas to carry out.
The approximately 40-page document, which the Israeli authorities code-named “Jericho Wall,” outlined, point by point, exactly the kind of devastating invasion that led to the deaths of about 1,200 people.
The translated document, hwihc was reviewed by The New York Times, did not set a date for the attack, but described a methodical assault designed to overwhelm the fortifications around the Gaza Strip, take over Israeli cities and storm key military bases, including a division headquarters.
Hamas executed the plan with astonishing accuracy. The strategy involved launching a large number of rockets right at the beginning of the assualt, using drones to disable the security cameras, and deploying automated firearms along the border. Additionally, their fighters entered Israel in large numbers using paragliders, motorcycles, and by foot. All of these actions took place on October 7th.
The plan also included details about the location and size of Israeli miliary forces, communication hubs and other sensitive informtion, raising questions about how Hamas gathered its intelligence and whether there were leaks inside the Israeli security establishment.
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials.”
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